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ARE DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS INFLUENCED 
BY SOCIAL SECURITY? * 
Jan H.M. NELISSEN and Piet A.M. VAN DEN AKKER 
Tzlburg Umuersz~v, The Netherlands 
Received September 15, 1986: accepted July 6, 1987 
On the basis of the existing literature we examined the points at which social security and family 
demography meet. The main conclusrons are: (1) child allowances will only affect fertihty if the 
level of benefit 1s rather substantial: (2) unemployment provisions may affect fertihty; (3) 
remarriage frequency IS probably affected by public asststance benefits; (4) the same posstbly 
holds for the divorce frequency. These conclusions are tentative: the results are contradictory from 
many viewpoints, some fields have hardly been investigated and tt IS unclear whether the effects 
are temporary or lasting. 
1. Introduction 
Just as the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth 
century marked the transition from the agrarian to the bourgeois family 
type, so the development of the welfare state in the sixties can be 
considered as the next break in attitudes towards marriage, family and 
relation formation (see Van den Akker 1982; Van der Avort 1985). A 
new type of marriage emerges out of the bourgeois-companionship 
type. Its character is more open and self-expression is the most im- 
portant motivation, not only in order to provide the marriage with a 
certain substance and meaning, but also regarding the decision of 
whether or not to continue the marriage. The role differentiation and 
balance of power between husband and wife and between parents and 
children no longer progress along the known paths, but are the per- 
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sonal constructions of those who are members of one of the possible 
primary relations. 
The extent to which the principles of individualization and pluri- 
formity (because these are the chief conceptions shaping the formation 
and dissolution of primary relations) can be developed is highly depen- 
dent on the material conditions to which they are subjected. In the 
western world one of the factors determining these material conditions 
is the social security system. This means that programs in the field of 
social security affect to some degree the formation, the structuring and 
the dissolution of primary relations. Thus the birth of a child leads to a 
financial allowance for the family concerned, and it is valid to ask to 
what extent the existence of child benefit programs affects the parents’ 
decision to have a child. On the other hand, getting married can be 
financially disadvantageous in some cases, if it results in the loss of a 
benefit. MacDonald and Sawhill (1978) note that ‘no schedule of tax 
liabilities or transfer benefits can be incentive-free in its treatment of 
the family’. They are only claiming that the programs referred to 
contain certain incentives to encourage, or indeed discourage, certain 
forms of behaviour. Whether they do in fact lead to this behaviour is 
the next question. ‘The empirical consequences of such incentives, 
however, remain controversial or unanswered’ (Wolf 1984), since the 
motivation for forms of demographic behaviour is a highly complex 
matter in which many factors play an important role, the financial 
incentive of social security being only one of them. 
In her study on the relation between government policy and family 
formation Ouwehand-Pijs (1984) presents social security as part of an 
overall government policy that also contains many other elements, such 
as emancipation, labour market policy, housing and migration. Besides 
this there are many other factors of an economic, social, cultural and 
psychological nature at stake. 
It is difficult to separate the effects of the different variables. This 
makes the effect of measures in the field of social security less clear. As 
a consequence, it may lead to problems when governments wish to 
influence demographic developments. This is possibly one of the rea- 
sons why efforts in the field of fertility that have been and are still 
being made to increase the number of births, appear to be unsuccessful. 
‘To what extent the attained fertility is the result of outside influences 
is difficult to ascertain. Concerning the short term, it would seem wise 
to assume a very small effect at best’ is the conclusion of Rozendal et 
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al. (1985) after a comprehensive study of the Dutch situation. In the 
longer term they presume that a significant effect is not unlikely. 
Studies in the field of the possible effects of government measures on 
relation formation and dissolution are scarce, especially in Europe. The 
study by Ouwehand-Pijs (1984). for example, has to be regarded as 
groundwork for the Netherlands. 
The purpose of this article is to review, on the basis of the existing 
literature, the points at which social security and family demography 
meet. From the point of view of family demography we can list four 
demographic processes, viz. : fertility, first marriage, remarriage and 
divorce. Because we assume that the existence of social security does 
not influence mortality in the western world, we do not consider the 
death of a partner. With reference to social security we restrict our- 
selves to those programs that are thought to be the most relevant to our 
purposes. This means that we look at child benefits, social assistance 
benefits, unemployment benefits, disability benefits and old-age pen- 
sions. This order is not arbitrary: it reflects the extent to which these 
benefits have been studied within the context relevant for us. 
2. The influence of social security on fertility 
In research into the influence of social security on fertility, child 
benefit, in particular, has long been in the limelight. Other public 
assistance programs are also sometimes the object of research. These 
include, for example, those programs that are aimed at single-parent 
households. The effect of programs in the field of (long-term) unem- 
ployment, sickness, disability and health care has scarcely been in- 
vestigated. A totally different subject is the possible effect resulting 
from the creation of programs for the elderly. This refers particularly to 
old-age pensions. The existence of these pensions means that one no 
longer has to consider children as a necessary investment for old age. 
This aspect has received much attention in the literature, but since it is 
now of negligible importance in the western world, we will not go into 
details here. 
2.1. Financial compensation and fertility 
Studies have been carried out on the effect of child benefit programs 
and other family assistance schemes on fertility in different countries 
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using a variety of methods and differing questions. People have been 
interviewed by means of surveys: government measures have been 
analysed and evaluated (separately or in combination) and compared 
for different countries (see, for example, Leeuw 1983; Ouwehand-Pijs 
1984). Roughly speaking, we distinguish three kinds of research in this 
field: 
(a) surveys based on hypothetical (what-if) questions concerning ef- 
fects or acceptance of population-policy measures; 
(b) empirical research into the effects at the micro level with regard to 
desired, expected and attained fertility; 
(c) empirical research into the effects at the macro level, in which 
countries or regions are compared. 
2.1. I. Surveys with a hypothetical questionnaire 
In this kind of research the study objectives are to get people’s 
opinions and answers to hypothetical questions. The studies by Van 
Knibbeler (1953), De Wit and Somermeijer (1977) and Bureau Lagen- 
dijk (1983) can be mentioned for the Netherlands. The results obtained 
by Van Knibbeler and De Wit and Somermeijer show that 24 and 23% 
respectively of the respondents are of the opinion that the level of child 
benefit influences the desired number of children. Bureau Lagendijk 
concluded that one consequence of a population policy that favours 
children is that 22% of people say they want more children, while 77% 
say they want the same number. Rozendal et al. (1985) found that 12% 
of the respondents who said they did not definitely intend to have one 
or more children, would seriously reconsider their decision if certain 
programs were to be introduced by the government. In this way the 
authors arrived at ‘a rough indication of the size of the group that in 
the short term might show some interest in a balanced package of 
measures in the sphere of creches and leave of absence, supplemented 
by financial measures’ (Rozendal et al. 1985: 172). They also found the 
existence of a fairly large group of persons who are in principle 
opposed to a pro-natalistic government policy, but who then go on to 
favour the introduction of a number of pro-natalistic measures when 
these are mentioned in concrete terms. 
The research carried out by Simon and Simon (1975) relates to the 
United States. Their conclusion is that a (hypothetical) graduated child 
benefit would have little pro-natalistic effect. The amount would have 
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to be quite high to have any significant effect. Twenty percent were 
prepared to modify the desired number of children in the event of a 
$300 benefit. The percentage declined very fast when the amount was 
lower. 
A survey conducted by Mehlan (1977) in East Germany revealed 
that 23% felt that pro-natalistic (financial) measures would certainly 
have a positive effect on the desired family size. About 17% thought 
that this would probably be the case, and 60% were uncertain about the 
effect. 
Hatzold (1979) investigated the expected effect of the introduction of 
child benefits amounting to DM 200 (variant 1) and DM 300 (variant 
2) a month respectively in combination with an education supplement 
(for all parents with one or more children under the age of three and 
where the wife has no job) of DM 300 (variant 1) and DM 500 (variant 
2) a month respectively in West Germany. The result was that 17% 
(variant 1) and 22% (variant 2) respectively of the respondents were of 
the opinion that the expected family size would probably be influenced. 
A similar proportion thought this would certainly be the case. Hatzold 
also noted that the measures had more effect as the income of the 
respondents was lower and the financial benefits offered were higher 
(Hatzold 1979: 113). 
Dutch research indicates that attempts to increase the number of 
births by financial incentives have little effect at best (Van de Kaa 
1973; Niphuis-Nell 1981; Janssen and Vermunt 1983). Zeegers and 
Godefroy (1953), Van Lier (1972) and Heeren (1974) conclude that 
there is no effect at all. The idea put forward by Petersen (1965) is very 
interesting. This author states that child benefits have a preventive 
effect, but not a curative one. This means that government is able to 
promote the continuance of an existing traditional system of rules and 
values by means of child benefits, but that it is not possible to revive a 
collapsed birth level. Most authors agree that the existence and the 
level of child benefit help to promote a climate in favour of children. 
For that reason child benefit still has an effect in an indirect way, 
certainly in combination with other measures (day care centres, leave of 
absence, and so on); see Staatscommissie Bevolkingsvraagstuk (1974), 
Wijle (1976) and Lory (1980). 
2.1.2. Empirical research into effects at micro level 
Research has been conducted not only among the population as a 
whole, but also among specific risk populations; in the latter case with 
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a particular purpose in mind, for example to discover the motives of 
men and women in realizing a certain family size. It is usual in this 
context to distinguish between desired, expected and realized family 
size. Here we concentrate on the possible effect of financial incentives 
on the decision of individuals to have an additional child. Three kinds 
of measures are considered: (a) a cluster of measures intended to be 
pro-natalistic, such as continued payment of salary during pregnancy 
leave and parental leave; (b) public assistance programs, such as the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children in the United States (AFDC); 
and (c) tax advantages, such as the Negative Income Tax program 
(NIT). 
Pro-natalistic measures in the sphere of birth premiums, child be- 
nefits, continued payment of salary in the case of pregnancy or 
parental leave, free day care centres and so on are applied in a number 
of Eastern European countries. Pongraz and Molnar (1980) investi- 
gated the effect of pro-natalistic measures in Hungary on third children 
in about 1974. The results of their research indicate a limited effect. 
Since its introduction the AFDC has been the subject of political 
and societal discussion, and of scientific research. One of the first 
studies on the possible connection between public financial assistance 
and fertility took place in Canada. Madison (1964) analysed the 
consequences of the introduction of family allowances in Canada in 
1944. At first sight it would seem that these family allowances stimu- 
lated fertility. Upon closer examination this appears to have been a 
period effect (as a consequence of World War II). This is affirmed by 
the developments in the United States, where provisions in this area 
did not exist at that time, and yet the same trends were discernible. 
As we have already mentioned, a large number of studies have been 
carried out on the influence of the AFDC program in the United 
States. This program was set up to give financial support to those 
households that can be considered as being in distress. Placek and 
Hendershot (1974) examined the ‘brood-sow’ hypothesis. Because of 
the fact that the amount of the benefit grows as the number of children 
increases, the authors supposed that women receiving AFDC would be 
less disposed to use contraceptives, so that the number of children 
would be fairly high. The results, however, indicated the reverse. The 
idea that public assistance results in more, often illegitimate, children 
appears to be false. On the contrary, women receiving public assistance 
benefits are found to use contraceptives more often and better than 
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other women in comparable situations. Fechter and Greenfield (1973) 
reach the same conclusions. But Southwick (1978) and Janowitz (1976) 
report other findings, at least concerning illegitimate births. According 
to them, AFDC has a positive effect in this respect: ‘The results of this 
paper suggest that the welfare system does have an impact on illegiti- 
mate birth rates with most of this impact confined to births to younger 
women’ (Janowitz 1976: 493). The noted relation, however, holds 
mainly for non-whites and hardly at all for white people. The study by 
Cutright (1971) shows that there is also no connection between public 
assistance benefits and illegitimate births in countries other than the 
United States. 
The hypothesis that AFDC promotes fertility is also rejected in the 
study by Polger and Hiday (1974). Moffit (1980) and Winegarden 
(1973) were unable to discover any effects of benefits on family 
formation. 
The research of Presser and Salsberg (1975) yields surprising results. 
They interviewed twice a representative sample of women from New 
York City who had recently had their first child, with an interval of one 
year between interviews. In the first interview the results were identical 
to those of the authors just mentioned. Once more the hypothesis that 
AFDC promotes fertility had to be rejected: the desired family size 
appeared to be lower among mothers receiving an AFDC benefit than 
among mothers without any benefit. There was no difference with 
regard to the realized family size. In the second interview the desired 
family size appeared to have changed. Many recipients of the benefit 
had increased their desired family size. This might indicate that AFDC 
has a positive effect on fertility over a longer period. 
Some studies were also carried out to investigate the results of the 
‘Income Maintenance’ program. The purpose of this program was to 
realize a minimum income by means of a simplified transfer system. 
This income was higher than the current level of the AFDC payments. 
The effect of the Negative Income Tax programs (which were part of 
the IM-program) on fertility is examined by, among others, Wolin 
(1978), Cain (1977), Wolf (1984) and Keeley (1980). Keeley concludes 
that the effect is significantly negative for white women (they have 
fewer children than comparable women who do not participate in the 
NIT program), very positive for Chicanos and there is no significant 
effect for blacks. Keeley’s data relates to the Seattle-Denver experi- 
ment. Regarding the Gary experiment Wolin (1978) concludes that the 
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fertility of women receiving first an AFDC benefit and then involved in 
the NIT experiment was negatively affected. Cain (1977) failed to 
ascertain any effect in the New Jersey-Pennsylvania experiment. Unlike 
Wolin, Wolf (1984) finds a significant increase in household size of 0.1 
persons in a further analysis of the data from the Gary experiment. But 
this is primarily the consequence of a rise in the mean family size of 
single-parent families of which the head is a non-working woman. In 
any case one cannot speak of a real pro-natalistic effect, but rather of a 
rearrangement: children are often imported into the single-parent family 
of black women. Generally, these are children of relatives. 
Other authors come to the same conclusions. Bradbury (1978) con- 
cludes that an increase in benefits has only promoted fertility in a 
limited number of cases. And in Chile, where in the framework of a 
family support program an extra amount was paid for every dependent 
person, Plank (1978) found that the relation between receipt of public 
assistance benefit and fertility was negative rather than positive. 
2.1.3. Empirical research into effects at macro level 
A third way in which the interdependence of financial incentives and 
fertility are studied is characterized by a high aggregation level. At 
regional or national level demographical data is compared with infor- 
mation from social security or tax statistics or with data relating to 
special measures that have been taken by government to implement a 
pro-natalistic policy. 
In the United States, Winegarden (1974), Moore and Caldwell (1979) 
and Vining (1983) examined the effect of AFDC benefits at the macro 
level. This approach was made possible because the level of the benefits 
and the eligibility requirements differ from state to state. The re- 
searchers did not find any pro-natalistic effect. However, Winegarden 
believes that the degree of certainty in getting a benefit may possibly 
influence the desired number of children. Baumol (1974) too, was 
unable to find a significant relation between social security benefits 
and the frequency or localization (the timing of the births) of fertility. 
Demographers have studied the possible effects of pro-natalistic 
government measures in different European countries. Although their 
conclusions are sometimes contradictory, it is nevertheless possible to 
discern a more or less consistent picture. 
Frejka (1980) investigated the demographic effects of the pro-natalis- 
tic population policy in Czechoslovakia. His conclusion is that the total 
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fertility rate would have been significantly lower in the period after 
1970, if this policy had not been conducted. 
Most authors, however, come to other conclusions. They do so after 
studying the longitudinal course of fertility. Pressat (1979) and David 
and McIntyre (1981) analysed population policy in a number of 
Eastern European countries in this way. From their analyses it can be 
deduced that population policy has only a temporary effect at best. 
Senker (1981) arrives at the same conclusion for Bulgaria. A possible 
explanation for this is that people will start to consider the financial 
incentives as normal in the course of time (David 1982; Lehto 1981). 
Festy (1981) examined the effects of the policy measures in Hungary. 
He concludes that the measures have only affected the localization of 
the births. It seems that there is no effect on cohort fertility (Festy 
1981: 408). Janssen and Vermunt (1983: 108) reach the same conclu- 
sion. Vortman (1979) finds that in 1976 the pro-natalistic policy in East 
Germany had only a limited effect. 
As well as in the Eastern European countries, research has also been 
carried out in some Western European countries into the possible effect 
of pro-natalistic measures. The number of studies, however, is very 
limited. For example, although France has practised a pro-natalistic 
policy since the beginning of this century, with financial incentives 
dominating, the number of studies on its effects is very limited in that 
country. Febvay (1959) concludes that the introduction of the ‘Code de 
la Famille’ has strongly influenced the family size. After the introduc- 
tion of this law, the mean number of children of employees (who 
received higher child benefits than the self-employed) was 20% higher 
than that of the self-employed. Leeuw (1983: 266), however, queries 
this conclusion. Janssen and Vermunt (1983: 65-66) find it too early 
yet to reach conclusions with regard to the pro-natalistic measures 
introduced at the beginning of the seventies. A limited effect for the 
years 1979-1981 is not unlikely, though these effects are probably of a 
temporary nature. Ekert-Jaffe (1985) disagrees with this. On the basis 
of a comparative study of child benefits and other family assistance 
benefits in the Common Market she concludes that these social security 
programs have a positive effect on fertility. She estimates that the high 
level of the benefits in France gives rise to 0.2 extra children per 
woman. If the benefits covered the costs of children completely, this 
would result in 0.5 instead of 0.2 extra children. 
The effects seem to be very limited in the other European countries. 
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Lehto (1983) thinks that the pro-natal&tic policy has had at best a 
temporary effect in Finland. Sweden has no direct pro-natalistic policy. 
though a number of measures have been taken to increase the number 
of female employees. The financial programs are compensatory amounts 
for the extra cost of living. According to Janssen and Vermunt (1983: 
161) it seems that a number of women nevertheless postponed having a 
child in the seventies. 
Van Praag (1980) analysed studies on France, Belgium, the United 
States and research done by the United Nations. He concludes that on 
the basis of the fertility rate it cannot be deduced that child benefits 
affect fertility. 
Comparing the results of research done on a macro level with those 
on a micro level it can be said that they pretty much complement one 
another. We conclude that about 20% of the parents who have a first or 
subsequent child were swayed in their decision by the existence of 
pro-natalistic measures. However, only a very small percentage were 
guided exclusively by these measures. Although this result in itself 
would seem to suggest a positive influence, demographical researchers 
have argued convincingly that this effect is only of a temporary nature 
in most cases and that the mean number of children per woman is 
scarcely affected by it. The only exception is probably France, where a 
slight positive effect may be supposed. 
2.1.4. Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing: 
(a) Generally, people do not consider child benefits to have a strong 
effect on the number of children. It is striking that respondents 
believe that ‘other people’ are more easily influenced than them- 
selves. 
(b) As far as there is any effect, it is thought to be more pronounced 
for families with a low income than for those with a high income. 
(c) Some effect is assumed to exist, if the level of the child benefits is 
really considerable. However, the question is whether this is only a 
temporary effect that affects the localization but not the level of 
fertility in a longitudinal perspective, i.e., per generation. 
(d) There is also an indirect effect: child benefits have a positive 
impact on the creation of a positive attitude towards children. It is 
therefore important to incorporate child benefits in an overall 
package in which other measures also play a part. 
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Another field of social security is formed by the old-age provisions, 
and in particular old-age pensions. The hypothesis in the studies in this 
area is that these provisions cause a declining fertility level in the long 
term, since children are no longer needed to take care of their parents 
in later life. It is reasonable to assume that this process has now been 
completed in Western Europe and that this consideration is therefore 
no longer a significant factor. For this reason we will only go into this 
subject briefly. 
An extensive literature survey can be found in Nugent (1985). The 
studies appear to be contradictory in many cases. For example, Leiben- 
stein (1957, 1975) believes that old-age provisions are the most im- 
portant factor in explaining the decreasing fertility, whereas Lindert 
(1980) considers its influence to be negligible. Nugent describes the 
majority of the international cross-section studies as irrelevant. He 
claims that the results are strongly influenced by the accidental omis- 
sion or inclusion of certain countries. This applies for example to the 
studies of Friedlander and Silver (1967), Hohm (1975, 1976) and En- 
twistle and Winegarden (1984). This objection is not true tor the 
studies of De Vany and Sanchez (1977, 1979). Cain (1981, 1983), 
Nugent and Gillaspy (1983) and Sanchez (1984). But even on the basis 
of these studies it is difficult to say anything definite about the possible 
effect. The combination of the indirect methods used and the (macro) 
level at which the effect is measured leads to problems. From the 
studies of Kdgitcibagi (1982) and De Vos (1984). however, it is clear 
that the old-age security value of children is a very important motive 
for having children. K~~it~iba~i shows that this even holds for devel- 
oped countries. In Western Germany, for example, 8% of the women 
questioned said it was a very important element in their decision to 
have children. 
Studies based on (micro-level) interviews produce results that are 
better from the point of view of inte~retability. Here we can mention 
the studies of Vlassof and Vlassof (1980) and Ridker (1980). The 
former find only weak support for the hypothesis under investigation, 
whereas Ridker obtains a more significant correlation. However, com- 
ments can be made on both studies (see Datta and Nugent (1984). 
Nugent’s general conclusion is that the correlation between old-age 
provisions and fertility is weak and often contradictory. The most 
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important reason for this is that almost all cases are based on sec- 
ondary analysis of data, in which the hypothesis under investigation 
was not the main issue. 
Our conclusion is that the system of old-age provisions in North 
America and especially Western Europe is nowadays so good that this 
motive for having (extra) children is no longer existent, at least at the 
micro level. For in some circles the present demographical situation 
gives cause for apprehension with regard to the old-age provisions in 
the longer term. This apprehension could result in an appeal to and be 
a cause of a collective responsibility to increase the fertility level. It is 
known from the literature, however, than an appeal to collective 
responsibility can only have a limited influence on individual fertility 
behaviour. 
2.3. Unemployment (benefits) and fertility 
Research into the effects of unemployment provisions and especially 
unemployment benefits is scarce. Some research has been carried out 
into the consequences of being unemployed for fertility, but here again 
the scope has been limited. The hypothesis that unemployment has an 
effect on fertility behaviour is partly based on the income position of 
the unemployed person and therefore on the social security system. For 
this reason we will briefly go into the correlation between unemploy- 
ment and fertility. 
Theoretical premises for the hypothesis that unemployment (and 
especially its consequences for income) affects the fertility are provided 
by the theories of Easterlin (1968, 1978) and the ‘new home economics’ 
(see Becker 1960; Ermisch 1979). In the studies by Easterlin the relative 
economic status (the economic status that is actually reached in propor- 
tion to aspirations formed on the basis of the situation in the past) is 
the central issue. In this way the deviations of the received income with 
respect to the expected trend in income development determine the 
relative economic status. This relative economic status in turn de- 
termines fertility. The hypothesis for this is that couples who are 
confronted with an income that is lower than they had expected on the 
basis of the situation in the past, are able to increase their disposable 
income by limiting the family size, since the lower the family size, the 
higher the amount that can be spent per member of the family. This 
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behaviour is independent of the level of the income; the main thing is 
the income in proportion to the expected standard of living. 
The proponents of the theory of the ‘new home economics’ disagree. 
They assume that fertility behaviour is determined by the opportunity 
costs, in which case labour participation of the wife and the income of 
husband and wife are the crucial factors. Unemployment is an im- 
portant factor in both theories because of the fact that it affects 
income. It is therefore an obvious step to assume that social security, 
and especially unemployment benefit programs, affects the unemploy- 
ment + (lower) income + fertility relation. 
At the macro level Easterlin’s hypothesis is confirmed in a number 
of countries. See, for example, Klotz and Neal (1973), Leridon (1978) 
and Jockel and Pflaumer (1981). The same holds for the theory of the 
‘new home economics’. For the period 1950-1976 Serow (1980) ex- 
amined both theories for fertility according to marriage duration in the 
Netherlands. His results give support to both theories. In contrast, 
there has been scarcely any research at the micro level. 
One of the studies on the correlation between fertility and unem- 
ployment at the micro level was carried out by Van Loon and Pauwels 
(1983). They tried to investigate the way in which the desired number 
of children is affected by unemployment. The study comprised a survey 
among married people below 35 years of age living in the Antwerp area 
(in Belgium). It was found that for 74% of the people who wanted more 
children, the desired number of children was not affected by whether or 
not they were unemployed. However, 20% wanted fewer children in this 
unemployment situation. This preference was particularly common 
amongst childless and 2 + families. The desired number of children 
remained unchanged in 85% of one-child families. Of those who did not 
want any more children, 11% would have desired fewer children if they 
had known beforehand that they would eventually become unem- 
ployed. The percentage was significantly higher for husbands than for 
wives (25% and 9% respectively). The decline in income was the main 
reason for this change of mind. Besides the duration of unemployment, 
the age of the mother and the age of the youngest child were further 
important factors. 
Hoefnagel (1976) investigated the factors that possibly influence the 
number of additionally desired children in the Netherlands. Note- 
worthy is the finding that low-income categories want a higher ad- 
ditional number of children than the modal-income categories, espe- 
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cially when they already have more than two children. Families who 
have financial problems want fewer additional children than families 
who are able to save. Notable too is the result that a pessimistic view 
with regard to future employment possibilities did not induce a desire 
for a lower number of additional children. 
Very closely linked to social security is the redistribution of income. 
Repetto (1973, 1978, 1979), Kocher (1973), Rich (1973) and Winegar- 
den (1978) conclude that income-levelling causes a decline in fertility. 
The argument for this is the negative correlation between income and 
fertility. It is claimed that this correlation is asymmetrical: a small 
income increase for a couple with a low income induces a fertility 
decline which is more than the fertility increase caused by a small 
income decrease for couples with higher incomes. The consequence of 
this is that income redistribution would lead to a lower fertility level. 
Hoefnagel (1976) expects that a government policy that focuses on 
income-levelling would decrease marriage fertility further in the 
Netherlands. Research done by Boulier (1982) into this correlation did 
not produce convincing support for this hypothesis. 
We draw the following conclusions: 
(1) Unemployment and unemployment benefits seem to affect the 
desired number of children through the income. The effect on the 
realised family size has not been examined. 
(2) The absolute level of the benefit is probably of limited significance. 
More important are: 
(a) the relative decrease of income: the closer the unemployment 
benefit is to the former income, the less will be the effect of 
being unemployed; 
(b) the extent to which the family can manage with the benefit. 
(3) Lower fertility is also caused by longer duration of the unemploy- 
ment, a higher age of the unemployed person and, if there are 
already two or more children, by a higher age of the youngest child. 
(4) Unemployment affects the desired number of children of husbands 
more than that of wives. 
3. The effect of social security on marriage 
The studies in the field of the effect of social security on marriage 
are limited to the function of public assistance benefits paid to (di- 
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vorced) women. Almost all studies relate to the United States. Besides 
the effect of public assistance benefits on marriage, the significance of 
wives’ income for marriage frequency has also been investigated. Next, 
the possible effects of unemployment provisions are considered, and 
finally the effect of the General Old-Age Pensions Act and the fiscal 
law amendments in the Netherlands will be discussed. It is striking that 
investigators have paid more attention to the possible effects on remar- 
riages than on first marriages. 
3.1. Public assistance benefits and marriage 
Apparently it is generally believed that public assistance benefits do 
not affect the frequency of the first marriages. In the literature we 
hardly came across any studies on this subject. 
Regarding the possible effect of public assistance benefits on remar- 
riage we found that the majority of the studies in this field conclude 
that the existence of some form of public assistance benefit decreases 
the remarriage frequency. Hutchens (1979), for example, investigated 
the effect of AFDC on the remarriage frequency of women with 
children. The hypothesis that public assistance benefits decrease remar- 
riage was affirmed. Hutchens’ explanation for this is that women with 
children less often enter the marriage market (see also Van den Akker 
and Zeijl 1983), and also tend to search longer. The latter is possible 
because they are able to supply their needs by way of the public 
assistance benefits, albeit minimally in most cases. This explanation is 
supported by Ross and Sawhill (1975). They show that the receipt of an 
AFDC benefit prevents hasty remarriage; at least this is one of the 
possible explanations. Another explanation is that the chance of remar- 
riage is very low because the receipt of an AFDC benefit means being 
on the brink of poverty, and the presence of children does not improve 
such women’s attractiveness on the remarriage market. 
Mott and Moore (1983) tested the hypothesis that receiving a public 
assistance benefit is a motive for divorced women not to remarry. They 
retain more independence by continuing to receive the benefit. If they 
remarried, they would lose their benefit and with it their independence. 
On the basis of longitudinal research the investigators found some, 
albeit mild support for their hypothesis. 
Bahr (1979) also found a negative correlation between remarriage 
and public assistance benefits. The remarriage rate of divorced women 
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not receiving benefit is about three times that of divorced women 
receiving benefit in the United States. It also appeared that the remar- 
riage frequency of women receiving public assistance benefit decreased 
as the amount of the benefit increased. This might possibly indicate 
that the need to remarry vanishes, when the woman’s material cir- 
cumstances are favourable. However, the differences decrease as the 
age increases. 
Duncan (1976) studied the factors affecting the remarriage rates of 
women with children. He found no negative correlation between AFDC 
and remarraige, which contradicts the research mentioned above. 
Hannan et al. (1977) compared the remarriage rates of women 
receiving AFDC benefit with those receiving benefits within the frame- 
work of the Income Maintenance program. The latter benefits are 
generally higher. The effect of the type of benefit appeared not to differ 
noticeably. Van den Akker (1984) notes that we are not able to resolve 
the dilemma: do divorced women who receive benefit have less chance 
of remarrying (even though they would like to remarry) or do they 
prefer the divorced state because the public assistance benefits guaran- 
tee their financial independence? 
3.2. Wife’s income and marriage 
In the framework of the objective of our study the wife’s income 
from a job is also important. Some studies have been carried out to 
examine the effect of the level of wives’ incomes on first marriage and 
remarriage intensities. The significance of this cannot be considered 
without reference to the social security system. It was mainly during 
the sixties that the benefit rights of both men and women increased. 
The fact that a woman has a job assures her of an income in the 
medium term from welfare benefits if she would lose the job later on as 
a consequence of invalidity or redundancy. However, her rights to some 
kinds of benefit are often affected if she is married: the benefit rights 
may be linked to her husband’s income! As the number of working 
women increases, the need to find the protection, in the material sense, 
of an earning husband is reduced. 
Ermisch (1981) found a negative correlation between the level of 
women’s income in proportion to men’s and the percentage of married 
women. The same conclusion can be drawn from the ‘new home 
economics’ theory (see, for example, Fulop 1980). It would seem that 
J H.M. Nehssen. P.A.M. uan den Akker / Demographrc deoelopments and soclal secun~r 91 
women like to retain their independence with respect to men and 
incline more to marriage according as their own income is less. This 
holds a fortiori for divorced (or widowed) women faced with the 
decision of whether to remarry or not. According to Bahr (1979) the 
level of the income has a negative effect on remarriage, as we men- 
tioned before. Divorced women with a high income remarry less often 
than divorced women with a low income. 
Hannan et al. (1977) conclude that the position of divorced women 
in the marriage market strengthens as their income is higher, but at the 
same time this circumstance lowers their need or desire to remarry. 
3.3. Unemployment and marriage 
The effect of unemployment on marriage has hardly been investi- 
gated. One of the few investigators who have done research in this area 
is Santos (1975). He found a positive correlation between female 
unemployment and the percentage of married women and a negative 
one between male unemployment and the same percentage. The impact 
of the financial elements was not explicitly examined. But it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the expectations and uncertainty with 
regard to future income play an important role. We should point out in 
this connection that the results may be regarded as reflecting a tradi- 
tional pattern of values and norms concerning the allocation of tasks 
between men and women. In this context men and women decide to 
marry when the man is able to guarantee the family income. 
The security of a permanent income is especially important, con- 
clude Wolf and McDonald (1979) in their research into the correlation 
between income and remarriage. The absolute income at that moment 
is less important. 
3.4. Old-age provisions, fiscal policy and marriage 
In some countries old-age provisions affect the marriage or remar- 
riage of elderly people because of the fact that the right to and the level 
of an old-age pension are also dependent on the age and the marital 
status of the partner. Up until 1985, when the law was changed, this 
was true of the Netherlands, for example. A married woman had, 
generally speaking, no independent right to a state old-age pension. 
Her rights were an element of the pension that was paid to the 
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husband. If, on the other hand, a man and woman got married after the 
time they became eligible for the single-person’s pension, they both 
retained the right to the latter pension (which is 40% more than the 
pension a married couple receives). Beex (1980: 75) examined the effect 
of this element in the Dutch old-age pension system on remarriages. He 
found evidence that the nature of the legislation influenced the localiza- 
tion of remarriage. 
Recent changes in the Dutch tax system concerning double-income 
couples, which aim at removing the most important differences in the 
fiscal treatment of married and non-married persons, appear to have 
caused an increase in the number of marriages or remarriages of 
persons over 33 years of age. It is not clear how to interpret this 
increase. Some of this increase is probably temporary, but some of it 
will also be permanent. This is a consequence of the fact that the 
personal allowance of double-income couples is no longer dependent 
on age and marital status. This means that non-married double-income 
couples older than 33 lose the fiscal advantages of not being married. 
On the other hand, this measure may result in postponement or even 
cancellation of marriages involving single-income couples (see Centraal 
Bureau voor de Statistiek 1985). 
3.5. Conclusion 
In this section we have focussed on the possible effects of some 
social security provisions on marriage frequency. It is clear from the 
literature that research is mainly oriented towards remarriage and to a 
far lesser extent towards first marriages. The following conclusions are 
important: 
(1) State financial support by means of public assistance benefits to 
divorced women with children reduces remarriage frequency. This 
may be caused by two factors: 
_ the need to find material protection in marriage has disap- 
peared; 
_ the woman does not wish to abandon the independence which is 
made possible by the public assistance benefit. 
(2) The remarriage frequency of divorced women not receiving public 
assistance benefit is much higher than that of women receiving 
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benefit. Such a crude research result evokes many questions. In 
what way do women receiving benefit differ from those not receiv- 
ing it? 
_ Is their financial situation different? 
_ Are they distinguished by the presence of children, the number 
of children and their age? 
_ What role is played by the phenomenon of cohabitation? 
(3) The literature is not decisive about whether the level of the public 
assistance benefit influences remarriage: 
_ sometimes it is emphasized that only the receipt of a benefit is 
important, and not its level; 
_ in other studies, the remarriage frequency appears to decrease as 
the benefit amount increases: the need to look for financial 
protection is less. 
(4) The lower a woman’s income, the more inclined she is to marry or 
remarry. Having her own income makes it possible to live her own 
life independent of a husband. 
(5) When female unemployment is high, the percentage of married 
women is high, whereas when male unemployment is high this 
percentage is low. Exaggerated somewhat, it can be said that there 
is a trend for men to marry if they can earn a living and for women 
not to marry if they can earn a living. 
4. The effect of social security on divorce 
The quality of the social security system is especially important for 
non-working women who are considering divorce, who are involved in 
a divorce or who are already divorced. It may be assumed that the 
extent to which the financial interests of women are guaranteed after 
their divorce, will influence the decision of whether or not to divorce at 
the micro level. This will therefore be reflected in the divorce frequency 
at the macro level. The quality of the social security system also affects 
the norms and values relating to primary relation formation and 
dissolution. As the material consequences of divorce become less harsh, 
the phenomenon of divorce as such becomes more and more accepted. 
The quality of the social security system in the Netherlands is high 
when considered in an international context. We will therefore focus 
our attention first on the Dutch situation. We will then look at other 
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studies on the correlation between divorce and public assistance be- 
nefits. The possible influence of unemployment on divorce will also be 
dealt with. 
4.i. Public assistance benefits and divorce 
Since the mid-sixties, divorce frequency in the Netherlands has 
increased, while the remarriage frequency of divorced women has 
decreased. In 1965 the General Public Assistance Act became effective. 
The question that arises from this is: Are these two phenomena 
connected? Welfare state theory suggests that a connection is not 
inconceivable (see Van den Akker 1984: chps. 3 and 5). As one of the 
elements of a welfare state, public assistance benefits offer the wife the 
possibility of terminating an unsatisfactory marriage situation. This 
could mean that a number of married women get divorced who would 
otherwise be forced to continue the marriage, if the material conditions 
were less favourable. Moreover, as regards remarriage it is reasonable 
to suppose that the possibilities for divorced women of building up an 
independent life have increased by the existence of public assistance 
benefits. From an economic point of view, this means there is less need 
for them to remarry. On the other hand, the existence of the General 
Public Assistance Act will have influenced values and norms with 
regard to primary relation formation: a number of factors involved in 
the decision of whether or not to separate acquire a new significance. 
As a result the scales can be tipped in a different direction: what was 
considered before as satisfactory, or at least less unsatisfactory, may 
now be termed unsatisfacto~ or less satisfactory (see Van den Akker 
1984: 40). Especially for those who depend on public assistance benefit 
after the divorce, the existence of the General Public Assistance Act 
will be a relevant factor. 
A first glance at the available statistical data in the Netherlands and 
the fact that since 1978 the mean number of children involved in a 
divorce has decreased, seem to confirm the hypothesis that public 
assistance benefits are affecting the number of divorces. However, 
further analysis of the divorce trends in the United States and Western 
Europe shows that, in spite of the differences in the social security 
systems, the trends in divorce intensities in these countries are very 
similar. 
J.H.M. Nelwsen, P.A.M. uan den Akker / Demographic developments and social security 101 
Partly on the basis of this finding and the fact that the available data 
is very inadequate, Van den Akker (1984: 51) concludes that it is not 
possible to answer the question of whether the introduction of and 
further additions to the General Public Assistance Act have led to an 
increase in the divorce rate. The author believes, however, that the 
existence of public assistance benefits has made divorce a feasible 
option and more easily attainable. It has, in combination with other 
developments, contributed to the realization of a configuration and 
climate in which divorce can prosper. 
The same conclusion is reached by Aarts (1984: 6). He thinks that 
the General Public Assistance Act has influenced the way in which 
divorces proceed: its introduction has caused a relaxation of the Dutch 
divorce system. It has become easier to provide for the financial and 
economic consequences of a divorce (Aarts 1984: 13-14). 
Van Stolk and Wouters (1982) report a positive correlation between 
social security benefits and divorce rates in the Netherlands, this being 
particularly true for working-class women. In the Netherlands the idea 
that government has to find a solution for an individual’s problem, has 
become dominant. This seems to be the peace of mind of the welfare 
state. This should not be interpreted as suggesting that divorce in the 
Netherlands is often taken too lightly. Ouwehand-Pijs (1984) shows 
that the increase in divorce has not been larger amongst working-class 
women than among women from higher socio-economic classes, as Van 
Stolk and Wouters postulated. 
More research in the field of divorce and financial support to 
single-parent families has been conducted in the United States. The 
results, however, are often contradictory. There, public assistance be- 
nefits were introduced to consolidate family life. This was to be 
brought about by granting financial support to families and persons in 
economically untenable situations. In practice it seems that these 
programs have tended to bring about the opposite effects to those 
intended. 
Southwick (1978: 37), for example, concludes: ‘the welfare system 
does provide incentives to break down the family structure, both in 
terms of having husband-wife households and in terms of illegitimacy 
within the family’. A similar conclusion is reached by Honig (1974) and 
Garfinkel and Orr (1974). The same applies to Duncan and Morgan 
(1976): ‘We have found that high levels of AFDC payments may have 
encouraged divorce and separation but did not seem to affect remar- 
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riage’ (p. 18) and ‘Low-income couples living in states with the highest 
levels of AFDC payments were generally less likely to remain intact 
during the panel period’ (p. 17). 
Ross and Sawhill (1975) also find a positive correlation, but only for 
non-whites. For whites they find a negative correlation between AFDC 
payments and divorce. Minarek and Goldfarb (1976) and MacDonald 
et al. (1977) also find a negative correlation, but in these cases it is not 
significant. These two studies refer to states, while Ross and Sawhill 
use data on metropolitan areas. 
Moles (1979) is of the opinion that testing the hypothesis that public 
assistance benefits lead to higher divorce rates is very arduous. Studies 
appear to be contradictory and in any case the public assistance benefit 
forms only one element in a complex of interconnected possible in- 
fluencing factors. Moles’ conception is that the effect of public assis- 
tance benefit on divorce is limited. A possible effect may be found 
among some groups of women, viz.: non-working women, women with 
low incomes, and women with young children. Mayo (1976) also 
concludes that ‘family dissolution effects of ( . . . ) programs as AFDC 
appear to be minor’ (p. 421). Moles and Mayo reach this conclusion on 
the basis of an analysis of different studies in this field. We will 
mention here a number of these studies. 
By using the results of two national longitudinal surveys, the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics and the National Longitudinal Surveys, 
different authors have examined the correlation between divorce and 
public assistance benefits. The only researchers finding a clear positive 
correlation between AFDC payments and divorce are Hoffman and 
Holmes (1976). Although they find that states with a higher AFDC 
payment do not show a higher degree of marriage instability, the 
differences by income are remarkable. Low-income families display 
substantially higher instability and, conversely, the higher incomes 
show lower instability as the AFDC payments are higher. An explana- 
tion for this is not easy. Bishop (1980) points out that these results may 
be affected by other variables which the study did not check for (p. 
309). 
A weak correlation between divorce and public assistance benefit is 
found by Cherlin (1978) for white, married women of 14-24 years of 
age, and by Moore and Waite (1978) for married couples of which the 
wife is 18-48 years of age. In contrast to Cherlin’s results, Moore and 
Waite do not find any significant correlation for the same group of 
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women. Wolf (1977) too, finds no significant correlation. The results of 
Hoffman and Holmes (1976) are contradicted by the results of Sawhill 
et al. (1973, although Bishop (1977) puts on record a minor effect by 
means of logit-analysis. 
Darity and Myers (1984) examined the presence of single-parent 
families. They conclude that ‘black female headship is not statistically 
caused by welfare attactiveness ( . . . ). The statistical driving force 
behind the increase in black female-headed families appears to be the 
decline in the supply of black males’ (p. 765). 
Some studies were also carried out to investigate the results of the 
‘Income Maintenance’ program. The expectations were a decrease of 
financial problems as a consequence of the higher income and an 
increase in marriage stability (i.e., fewer divorces). In the experiment, 
families were classified into different payment levels and control groups. 
In contrast to expectations, Bishop (1977) found a higher divorce rate 
in families receiving this kind of public assistance benefit than in 
families not receiving these benefits. The conclusion is however only 
true for those families whose benefit was higher than the current 
AFDC payment. The same conclusion is reached by Hannan et al. 
(1977). Here we also find relatively more divorces amongst recipients of 
Income Maintenance benefits that are a little more than the minimum 
level. When the benefit is more than one and a half times the minimum 
level, any significant effect disappears. Hannan et al. (1978) investi- 
gated what causes this reversal. It appears that the effect depends not 
only on the level of the benefit, but also on the level of income enjoyed 
before benefit was received. The degree of independence of the wife 
and the extent of the change in it also play an important role. At some 
stage these factors become more important in the process than the level 
of the benefit. 
A study by Bahr (1979) indicated that families receiving public 
assistance benefit separate more frequently. The correlation decreased 
with an increase in age. On the basis of the same data, however, Draper 
(1981) did not find any significant relationship. He rejects Bahr’s 
results on methodological grounds. 
Sawhill et al. (1975) find significant effects arising from the influence 
of a negative income tax on divorce in their analysis of the New Jersey 
NIT experiment. The Income Maintenance experiments in Seattle and 
Denver also show an increase in divorce rates (Groeneveld et al. 1980). 
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4.2. Unemployment and divorce 
Other programs in the field of social security that may affect divorce 
rates are the unemployment and disability provisions. However, we do 
not know of any study on the effect of disability transfers. On the other 
hand, many investigations have shown that unemployment forms an 
important element in the decision of whether or not to separate. Here 
we will discuss a number of these studies. 
The relationship between divorce and unemployment has often been 
the subject of research in the United States. Becker et al. (1977) 
conclude that long-term unemployment increases the probability of 
separations. Cohen (1979) determines that the probability of separation 
increases by two to three times in the case of an unemployment 
duration of at least three weeks over a three-year period. ‘The evidence 
for the proposition that families whose head experiences unemploy- 
ment are more likely than others to split seems quite strong’ is one of 
the conclusions of Bishop (1979: 304). Sawhill et al. (1975) show that 
periods of unemployment are reliable omens for divorce or separation. 
In the literature attention is also paid to the question of why 
unemployment may induce a divorce. This question has been consid- 
ered from different viewpoints and disciplines. A number of factors 
appear to play a role. 
In the first place, a period of unemployment presents problems that 
were not foreseen at the time of the marriage or cohabitation. So the 
financial expectations anticipated by the partners in the relationship 
are not met as a consequence of the husband’s unemployment. This is 
an evidently negative element in the process of weighing costs and 
benefits, which both partners are engaged in. Hoffman and Holmes 
(1976) test the hypothesis that a continuing unemployment problem 
would increase the wife’s desire to separate. The certainty of having an 
income was thought to play a more important role than the income 
level. The authors constructed a certainty index, reflecting this cer- 
tainty with regard to income. The hypothesis was that a negative 
relationship exists between this index and the divorce rate: the greater 
the certainty, the lower the probability of divorce. The husband’s 
problems in the labour market were also measured by means of an 
index. The hypothesis here was that a negative relation exists between 
this index and marriage stability: the more problems there are, the 
higher the divorce rate. These hypotheses were tested, and accepted by 
means of longitudinal data. 
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In other respects expectations are not met. At the start of their 
marriage or cohabitation, husband and wife have certain expectations 
with regard to the complementarity and the compatibility of mutual 
roles. This expectation pattern is disturbed by unemployment. A dis- 
crepancy emerges between expectations and reality. This can place a 
heavy burden on the relation between the partners. The wife losing her 
job appears to have a more limited effect on the stability of the 
relationship: ‘The critical importance of the male instrumental role in 
marital happiness finds support in study after study’ (Hicks and Platt 
1970). However, their research is somewhat dated. The question arises 
whether such research would yield the same conclusions at this mo- 
ment. 
The third point is that in our society having a job has a big social 
impact on one’s status; this is especially true for men. For this reason 
unemployment can cause dissatisfaction with oneself and with one’s 
existence. Reputation and self-respect are closely related. Depression 
and stress can be the consequence of this process, and these elements 
constitute factors undermining the relationship (Catalan0 and Dooley 
1977). Finally, Hicks and Platt (1970) also conclude that the negative 
effect of the husband’s unemployment increases as the relative dif- 
ference between his income and his wife’s decreases (the wife earning 
more) as a consequence of the unemployment. It also appears that even 
if the husband does the housekeeping, this does not help the stability of 
the relationship. 
Very closely related to the above is the connection between income 
changes and the probability of separation. Coombs and Zumeta (1970) 
Mott and Moore (1977) and Becker et al. (1979) have done research in 
this field. The results confirm the findings just presented with regard to 
unemployment. 
Mott and Moore (1977), using data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey, find that a decrease in the husband’s income goes hand in hand 
with an increase in the divorce probability. Becker et al. (1979) con- 
clude that high as well as low incomes positively influence the divorce 
probability. An increase in the husband’s expected income, however, 
reduces the probability of divorce, whereas an increase in the wife’s 
income heightens this probability. 
Coombs and Zumeta (1970) conclude that the wife’s behaviour and 
expectations with regard to the husband’s income are important indica- 
tors for divorce. Two thirds of women from dissolved marriages consid- 
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ered the income of their former husband insufficient. In existing 
relationships this figure was less than 50%. 
4.3. Conclusions 
(1) The existence of public assistance benefits has made divorce more 
feasible and more easily attainable in the Netherlands. The General 
Public Assistance Act has created a climate in which divorce has 
gradually come to occupy a less controversial place. 
(2) The relation between government financial support (by way of 
public assistance benefits or fiscal advantages) and marriage stabili- 
zation (which these programs are meant to promote) cannot be 
established unequivocally on the basis of the existing literature. The 
results are often contradictory. Effects work in two directions: 
_ The family receiving financial support experiences a material 
improvement, so that tensions are reduced and marriage stability 
is furthered. Bishop (1977) calls this the ‘income effect’. 
_ If the wife’s financial situation is improved in the case of a 
divorce, the divorce threshold is lowered for some families. This 
effect of the wife’s financial independence can be compared with 
the finding that working wives with a high income are more 
inclined to separate than other women. 
It seems that the divorce-stimulating effect is somewhat stronger 
than the divorce-limiting effect, so as a consequence the scale turns 
in favour of a higher divorce rate. This is especially true of some 
specific groups, viz. non-working women with a low income and 
young children. For these groups government support is the only 
reasonable alternative to an unsatisfactory marriage. 
(3) In the event of unemployment, the probability of divorce rises. 
There are many possible reasons for this: 
_ Unemployment generally implies a reduction in the man’s in- 
come; such a decrease in itself has a divorce-stimulating effect. 
_ The financial expectations of the partners are no longer being 
met; not only has the family’s income level been unfavourably 
affected, but the certainty with regard to the means of support is 
fundamentally undermined. 
~ Mutual role expectations and behaviour have to be revised. This 
causes psychological stress. When the wife loses her job the 
effect is less: the existing role pattern is disturbed to a lesser 
extent. 
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5. Epilogue 
In spite of the large number of studies discussed in this literature 
review, it is clear that little is known about the effect of social security 
on the formation, composition and dissolution of primary relations. 
Furthermore, the results are contradictory on many points. This is 
partly a result of the fact that the studies were carried out in different 
countries, i.e., in a highly divergent social and cultural context. Thus, 
the AFDC payments cannot be compared directly with the public 
assistance benefits in the Netherlands, and the birth stimulating mea- 
sures applied in some Eastern European countries would probably have 
a totally different effect in the economic, social and political climate of 
Western Europe or the United States. 
It is therefore understandable that the conclusions drawn at the end 
of each section are meant to be regarded rather as starting points for 
further study than as an attempt to map the relationship between social 
security and demographic phenomena. For this reason this study may 
be considered as a stimulus for further research, the conclusions drawn 
serving as topics requiring particular attention. In this context the 
nature of the relationship has certainly to be considered. It is clear that 
a lot of factors are at work. Economic, psychological and socio-cultural 
elements are all important, but the question of where and when has not 
been answered convincingly. With all respect for the attempts at 
conceptualization, which - especially from psychologists and with 
particular regard to the desired number of children - have already been 
made (see, for example, Burch 1980) this article shows that there is an 
urgent need for a theoretical model in which the possible effects of the 
social security system on the demographic system are specified by 
several disciplines. We agree with Bagozzi and Van Loo (1987) who 
state: ‘It would be incomplete and shortsighted to view these activities 
as strictly economic, psychological, or social outcomes. Rather, family 
decision making manifests itself complexly as a social-psychological 
process where external economic and societal constraints shape psycho- 
logical states and these, in turn, influence the interactions between the 
spouses and ultimately their choices and outcomes’. Falbo and Becker 
(1980) reflect the same conception: ‘The influence of external factors 
on behaviour must always be mediated through the attitudinal or 
normative component’. 
Without going into detail at this stage, our study yields sufficient 
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indications for the thesis that the psychological point of view must be 
an important element in such a conceptual model. Finally, we give 
some examples to support this. 
- The receipt of a social security benefit has (social-) psychological 
connotations. To be thrown back on a benefit can give rise to 
negative consequences for the image and status of recipients. Their 
self-confidence can be undermined and they may feel like outsiders. 
This can affect personal relations and attitudes towards having 
children. 
_ Our results are ambivalent with respect to the effect of child al- 
lowances on the number of children. But one important finding is 
that the (level of the) child allowance also gives substance to the 
creation of a social-cultural climate in which husband and wife 
weigh the costs and benefits of having children (in psychological 
terms too). 
- It is clear that the desired number of children of unemployed people 
decreases as their unemployment duration gets longer. In virtue of 
this, the hypothesis that such factors as confidence in the future or 
stress appear as intervening variables is justified. 
- Financial support by means of the social security system can in- 
fluence the stability of existing partner relations in different ways. 
On the one hand, stress can be diminished by it, because certainty is 
provided; on the other hand, especially when there is a substantial 
financial deterioration, it is not only experienced as undermining the 
financial basis of the relationship, but also as a direct attack on the 
relation itself. 
_ When a family becomes dependent on a benefit, the partners’ mutual 
role expectations have to be revised. This change may lead to a 
psychological burden being created, and therefore to the destabiliza- 
tion of the relation, especially if the partners have traditional ideas. 
- In the Netherlands, the General Public Assistance Act has contrib- 
uted to the creation of a climate in which divorce has become 
gradually more normal and is accepted more and more by both the 
partners themselves and by society. 
- Government financial support for divorced people seems to diminish 
the frequency of remarriage. This could be the consequence of their 
not being obliged to look for financial support (by way of a 
marriage). Another supposition is that they do not want to give up 
their independence. The significance and role of unmarried cohabita- 
tion is important in this respect. 
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